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Abstract
In September 1999, Robin Lovitt was convicted and sentenced to death for the
murder of a pool hall manager in Arlington, Virginia. The DNA evidence that was a key
part of the government’s case was presented in a misleading and unfair manner. In this
case study, we first examine the way in which DNA evidence was misused. We then
discuss the failure of the legal system at all levels to recognize and remedy this problem.
Our goal is to explain how a system that supposedly leaves no stone unturned in capital
trials managed to miss or ignore a crucial problem with the scientific evidence that
supported the conviction. We argue that the Lovitt case is indicative of systemic
problems with the use of scientific evidence that could affect the fairness of criminal
trials nationwide and we suggest legal and institutional reforms that may help minimize
the risk of similar problems in the future.
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Introduction
Television dramas like the popular “CSI” series have highlighted the importance
of forensic science in criminal investigations. These programs show forensic scientists
solving crimes with unerring accuracy by examining and drawing conclusions from
physical evidence. Ironically, while television has been glorifying crime labs, there has
been growing skepticism about some of the claims that forensic scientists have been
making in court.1 For example, an article in the prominent journal Science argued that
many areas of the “forensic identification sciences” are “underresearched and oversold.”2
Instances in which forensic scientists have used shoddy methods, interpreted their results
carelessly and presented findings in a misleading manner have been widely documented.3
Concerns about problematic forensic evidence are supported by studies that look
at the causes of false convictions. While eyewitness error is widely recognized as the
leading cause, a recent review of 86 cases in which convicted defendants were exonerated
1

See e.g., Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL. 985 (2005)(questioning validity and accuracy of fingerprint identification); Adina
Schwartz, A Systemic Challenge to the Reliability and Admissibility of Firearms and Toolmark
Identification 6 COLUMBIA SCI. & TECH.. L.REV., 1 (2005)(questioning validity of toolmark identification);
L.C. Hartfield, Daubert/Kumho challenges to handwriting analysis. 26 THE CHAMPION 24 (2002); E.J.
Imwinkelried & W.A.Tobin, Comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) evidence: Valid inference or ipse
dixit? 28 OKLA. CITY .L. REV. 43 (2003); Saks, M. J. (2000). Banishing ipse dixit: The impact of Kumho
Tire on forensic identification science. 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 879 (2000); C.A. Stafford Smith & P. D.
Goodman, Forensic hair comparison analysis: Nineteenth century science or twentieth century snake oil?
2
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The coming paradigm shift in forensic identification science.
SCIENCE, 309, 892-95
3
See, Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse Of Scientific Evidence In Criminal Cases: The Need For Independent
Crime Laboratories, (1997) 4 VA. J. SOC POL'Y&L.439, 441; John Kelly and Phillip Wearne, Tainting
Evidence: Inside the Scandals at the F.B.I. Crime Lab ( Free Press 1998); Craig Cooley, Reforming the
Forensic Science Community To Avert The Ultimate Injustice, 15 STAN. L. & POLICY REV. 381, 396-397
(2004); William Thompson, Tarnish on the “Gold Standard”: Understanding recent problems in forensic
DNA testing. 30 THE CHAMPION, 10-16 (2006)(hereafter “Tarnish”). See also materials found at the
following websites: www.hpdlabinvestigation.org (materials on Houston crime laboratory scandal);
www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/9704a/ (materials on the FBI crime lab scandal);
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/ english/about/ pubs/morin/ (materials on the Canadian scandal
surrounding the false conviction of Guy Paul Morin); www.scientific.org (materials on DNA testing
problems in Houston, Virginia); www.corpus-delicti.com/forensic_fraud.html (an archive of news articles
on fraudulent forensic science); www.truthinjustice.org/junk.htm (materials on forensic error and fraud);
pdxnorml.org/LABSCAM.html (same).
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by DNA evidence found that bad forensic science was a close second.4 Eyewitness errors
were a factor in 71% of these cases, but “forensic science testing errors” occurred in 63%
of the cases and “false or misleading testimony by forensic scientists” occurred in 27% of
the cases.5
In light of these findings, it is important to consider the ability of the justice
system to detect and remedy problems with scientific evidence. We will argue that the
system, at present, does a poor job of distinguishing strong from weak forensic science.
As an illustration we will examine a capital case in Virginia in which DNA evidence was
presented to the jury in a highly misleading manner. Although this problem affected the
fundamental fairness of the trial, it was never addressed during direct appeals nor was it
addressed during collateral state and federal habeas proceedings. We will explore this
particular failure of the justice system in detail and seek to draw broader lessons about
the ability of the system to detect and remedy problems in forensic science, and how that
ability might be improved.
Section I of the article will provide an overview of the case of Commonwealth of
Virginia v. Robin Lovitt,6 focusing on the nature of the state’s DNA evidence, the
misleading manner in which that evidence was presented to the jury, reasons this problem
occurred and why it was not caught at trial. Section II will discuss the extensive review
of the case that occurred during direct appeal and during collateral state and federal
habeas proceedings. This discussion will reveal that the problems with the DNA
evidence, that we consider fundamental to the case, were never addressed. We will
comment on possible reasons for this failure. Section III will discuss Lovitt’s successful
4

Saks & Koehler, supra note 2.
Id., at 892.
6
260 Va. 497, 537 S.E.2d 866 (2000)(cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815)
5
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petition for clemency, which was granted on grounds unrelated to the problems with the
presentation of DNA evidence at trial. Section IV will discuss unsuccessful efforts to
have the Lovitt case reviewed by Virginia’s new Forensic Science Board and Scientific
Advisory Committee, which are state boards created for the purpose of overseeing and
improving the work of the state forensic laboratory. Finally, Section V will draw lessons
from the case-study analysis and make recommendations for improving the way in which
the justice system handles scientific evidence.
I. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Robin Lovitt
A. Facts of the Case as Presented at Trial7
In the early morning hours of November 18, 1998, two men entered Champions
Billiards Hall (the pool hall) in Arlington, Virginia and saw the night manager, Clayton
Dicks, fighting with another man behind the bar. The other man appeared to be an
African-American. When they saw the other man stab Dicks several times with a silvercolored weapon, they immediately left the pool hall and called the police. When police
arrived, Dicks was lying on the floor, fatally wounded. The pool hall cash register was
broken and a cash drawer was missing. A police canine unit found a pair of bloodstained
scissors in the woods about 15 yards behind the pool hall. The two eyewitnesses recalled
seeing a white Cadillac in the parking lot when they arrived at the pool hall that night, but
the car was gone when they returned with the police. The police issued a bulletin asking
officers to be on the lookout for an older white Cadillac.

7

This summary is drawn from the Virginia Supreme Court’s account of the facts on Lovitt’s direct appeal,
Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 502-08, as well as Reporter’s transcripts of the expert testimony
and closing arguments.
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Robin Lovitt, a former employee of the pool hall, was arrested for the crime
several days later, after turning himself in to police. Lovitt admitted to having stolen the
cash drawer, but claimed he had no involvement in the murder. According to his
account, he was in the pool hall restroom and emerged to see Dicks fighting with another
man. Wanting nothing to do with the fight, he ducked back into the restroom out of the
way. When he re-emerged, the man was gone and Dicks appeared to be dead. Needing
money, Lovitt decided to take a locked cash drawer from the register. He carried the cash
drawer through the woods behind the pool hall to the home of his cousin, who helped him
open it. Lovitt’s cousin, Warren Grant, who lived about a quarter mile from the pool hall,
testified at trial that Lovitt had brought the cash drawer to his home in the early morning
hours of November 18th and that the two had broken open the cash drawer and split the
money. Lovitt claimed that he left the pool hall on foot. He did not own a Cadillac.
During the preliminary hearing neither of the two eyewitnesses could identify
Lovitt as the man they had seen stabbing Dicks, but at trial one of the two testified he was
80% certain Lovitt was that man. An inmate who had been housed with Lovitt in the
Arlington jail testified at the trial that Lovitt had confessed to killing Dicks in order to
steal the money to buy drugs.
Forensic examination found no fingerprints matching Lovitt on the bloodstained
scissors. The shirt and pants Lovitt was wearing when arrested matched the description
provided by several witnesses of what Lovitt was wearing the night of the killing.
Examination of the shirt and pants found no bloodstains. However, when he was arrested
Lovitt was also wearing a jacket. A forensic analyst testified that there was a bloodstain
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on the front of this jacket although DNA tests on that stain had produced inconclusive
results.
DNA tests were also conducted on two bloodstains on the scissors. The state’s
DNA analyst testified that a stain near the pointed tip of one blade contained a DNA
profile consistent with the victim, Clayton Dicks. A second stain higher on the blade
contained a mixture of DNA from more than one person. The DNA profile8 of the
primary donor again matched Clayton Dicks. However, the stain contained an additional
genetic allele (allele 17 at locus vWA) that could not have come from Dicks but could
have come from Lovitt.9 Because only a single allele was found, rather than a complete
profile, the DNA analyst testified that she could not say conclusively whether Lovitt’s
profile was or was not consistent with that of the second contributor to the DNA mixture.
Nevertheless, Lovitt possessed the additional allele and therefore could not be eliminated
as a possible contributor. A DNA expert called by the defendant testified that
approximately 19% of African-Americans have the allele in question, and 81% do not
have that allele.
In closing arguments the prosecutor noted that Warren Grant (Lovitt’s cousin) and
a woman who lived with Grant had both testified that Lovitt was sweating when he
arrived at their house with the cash drawer. The prosecutor suggested Lovitt’s sweat was
the source of the extra allele on the scissors:
…we know that it is a mixture and we know that mixtures frequently are
made by fluids. So there is the blood from the victim, and there there is some
other body fluid. It could well be sweat, for instance.
But what you know is that when the defendant arrived at Warren Grant’s
house, both Warren Grant and Delores Harris noticed he was sweating, and that

8
9

[Background material to be added on DNA profiling]
[Definition of “allele” to be added]

Thompson & Dioso-Villa

6

was just minutes before he would have discarded those scissors, which was just
minutes before he had stabbed Clayton Dicks with them.
Now, nobody could say yes, this is definitely the defendant’s DNA. But
you will remember—and this is why it is important—that the goal of DNA
analysis is to exclude people from being the contributors of the DNA…and what
you know is that the defendant has an allele number 17.
Robin Lovitt cannot be excluded as the person who left the sweat on those
scissors.10
The prosecutor went on to argue that the blood on Lovitt’s jacket came from the
victim and that Lovitt was aware of that fact and tried to cover it up by claiming he had
not been wearing the jacket the night of the crime.
Blood on the jacket, that’s another circumstance for you to consider. [The
eyewitnesses] both told you the murderer had on a jacket. They said it was a blue
jacket, a dark jacket. And you can see [defendant’s] jacket in the Polaroid.
You know the defendant had on this jacket on the 24th of November. You
know it’s his jacket. And he had told Detective Hanula that he had been wearing
all of those clothes except for the shoes for the past few days.
Now, he told Officer Ferrone, I wasn’t wearing that jacket at the time it
occurred, and that gets to be another matter of significance.
The defendant was concerned obviously about blood on his clothing. He
told [the jailhouse informant] that he was concerned about blood on his clothing,
that he changed some of his clothing, and he mentioned particularly a T-shirt.
And he said that there was blood on the stomach area.
I’m not going to pick up the jacket again, but if you want to look at it, you
will notice that there were cut out pieces of where the DNA was on the jacket, and
that is where the blood spots were. And it is right there on the stomach area.
But of course it’s a dark jacket. He probably didn’t notice it in the
beginning…
Now I realize [the DNA expert] can’t tell you much about the blood and
she told you why, because somehow the dye or whatever was masking it. But you
do know that it fact there was blood on it.11
In sum, the prosecution presented what appeared to be a credible and convincing
case. The key difficulty for the prosecution obviously was proving that Lovitt actually
committed the murder rather than merely stealing the cash box after the crime, as he
claimed. Had the prosecution relied solely on the 80%-certain eyewitness and the
10
11

Reporter’s Transcript, p. 1530-31.
Id. at p. 1531-33.
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jailhouse informant, the case would have been weak, as problems with the reliability of
eyewitnesses and “jailhouse snitches” are well known.12 In that case, the loose end
concerning the Cadillac might well have troubled the jury.
What bolstered the case and made it credible was the scientific evidence that
appeared to link Lovitt directly to the stabbing through a classic double-transfer. DNA
consistent with Lovitt was found on the murder weapon while (apparently) blood from
the victim was found on Lovitt’s jacket, a fact Lovitt tried to cover up. The DNA tests
were hardly definitive, of course, but they appeared to provide convincing circumstantial
evidence. Based on the testimony, jurors could reasonably infer that there was better than
an 80% chance that an innocent person chosen at random would be eliminated as the
source of the extra allele on the scissors, and Lovitt was not eliminated. The DNA tests
on the jacket were “inconclusive,” but the location of the blood fit neatly with the
prosecution’s theory that Lovitt was the murderer. It was on the front of the jacket—right
where one would expect there to be blood splatter from the stabbing victim (and right
where the informant had claimed Lovitt found blood on a t-shirt that he discarded). The
DNA tests, as they were reported to the jury, made a weak and problematic case appear
solid and credible.
On September 20, 1999, after two hours of deliberation, the jury found Lovitt
guilty of capital murder of Clayton Dicks during the commission of a robbery. The trial
then entered a penalty phase which culminated in a sentence of death.

12

See generally, Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer, ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000).
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B. A Closer Look at the DNA Evidence
The DNA testing in the case was conducted by Carol Palmer of the Virginia
Division of Forensic Science (DFS) Northern Laboratory in Fairfax Virginia.13 Palmer
used a testing kit known as Promega PowerPlex that examines short tandem repeats
(STR’s) at eight genetic locations (loci) on the human genome.14 At each locus there are
several possible markers (called “alleles”) that a person might have. To identify those
alleles, the DNA from the eight loci is amplified (replicated) and then separated by length
on a gel.15 The alleles produce fluorescent “bands” that are detected by a computeroperated scanning device. The position of the bands on the gel indicates which of the
various alleles have been detected. The darkness or intensity of a “band,” which the
computer measures in units of optical density (“OD”), indicates roughly how much DNA
is present from the individual who was the source of the band. Each individual has two
alleles at each locus—one allele is inherited from each parent. Numbers are used to
designate the alleles.
The bands detected by the computer are displayed on a printout called a STaRCall
spreadsheet. 16 However, the analyst may sometimes decide to ignore or override the
computer’s determinations when deciding whether to report bands. Based on visual
examination of a “band” the analyst may decide, for example, that the “band” is spurious
or unreliable, and therefore decide not to report it or to call the results “inconclusive.”
Under the DFS protocol, the decision to call a band “inconclusive” rests entirely upon the
13

Palmer has a Masters Degree in Forensic Science from Virginia Commonwealth University.
For general background on STR testing, see John M. Butler, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY & GENETICS OF STR MARKERS, 2d Ed. (2005).
15
At that time, analysts in the Virginia DFS used the Hitachi/FM-Bio system, which uses gel
electrophoresis, to separate the amplified DNA by length and detect the resulting “bands.” For a complete
description of this system, see Butler, supra note 12, at 361-67.
16
STaRCall is a trademark of the company that produced the software used by DFS for band detection.
14
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subjective judgment of the analyst.17 There is no objective standard. In the Lovitt case,
analyst Palmer declared a number of bands that were detected by the computer to be
“inconclusive.” Her decision to disregard bands detected by the computer, which was
never reported to the jury, is part of what makes the DNA evidence in the case
problematic.
Table 1: Alleles Detected in DNA Testing—Commonwealth v. Lovitt
(Numbers in parentheses show the optical densities of the underlying bands as
shown in the StaRCall Spreadsheet)
Genetic Locus
Sample
CSF1PO
TPOX
THO1
vWA
D16S539 D7S820 D13S317 D5S818
Clayton
8,
8,
7,
11,
12,
8,
10,
8,
Dicks
13
9
7
14
13
11
14
12
Robin
10,
8,
7,
16,
9,
8,
11,
10,
Lovitt
12
11
9.3
17
12
12
12
12
Scissors
8 (271), 8 (296),
7
11(2553)
12 (75)
8 (146)
10 (140)
8 (456)
Stain B
13 (121) 9 (272)
(2314)
14(2508)
13 (61)
11 (129) 14 (101) 12 (483)
17 (131)
Jacket—
-INC***
-INC-INC-INC-INC-INC-INCCert. of
Analysis
Jacket— 10 (102)
***
***
16 (15),
***
8 (3),
11 (51),
10 (25),
StaRCall 12 (62)
17 (85)
12 (32)
12 (5)
11 (24),
Spread12 (26)
sheet
Note: *** indicates no bands were detected; INC indicates that the analyst deemed the
results “inconclusive.”
Table 1 shows the DNA profiles (sets of alleles) of the key samples in the Lovitt
case. There is no controversy about the DNA profiles of victim Clayton Dicks or
defendant Lovitt, which are shown in the first two rows of the table. The third row of the
table shows the alleles (bands) that were detected on the mixed stain on the scissors. The
numbers in parentheses are the optical density (OD) values for each band as shown on the
17

Commonwealth of Virginia, Department of Criminal Justice Services, Division of Forensic Science,
Fluorescent Detection PCR-Based STR DNA Protocol: Powerplex 1.1, 2.1 and 16 Bio Systems, Forensic
Biology Section Procedure Manual, Section 3 (copy on file with authors).
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STaRCall spreadsheet. 18 Analyst Palmer reported all of the bands that the computer
detected in the scissors stain. The bands that she elected not to report were all found in
the stain on Lovitt’s jacket. The fourth row of the table shows what Palmer reported
regarding the jacket stain in the laboratory’s Certificate of Analysis (formal report) on the
case.

At each locus she reported either that no results were obtained (designated by

“***”) or that the results obtained were “inconclusive” (designated “-INC-”). However,
examination of the STaRCall spreadsheet shows that the computer detected a total of
eleven bands in this sample at five different loci. The last row (row 5) shows the alleles
that the computer detected (with their corresponding optical densities).
During the trial, analyst Palmer testified that the DNA test results on the jacket
were inconclusive and the defense lawyers never challenged this characterization. The
prosecutor then argued that the blood on the jacket was from the victim, Clayton Dicks.
But the STaRCall results, shown in the last row of Table 1, tell a different story. The
computer detected bands at five of the eight loci examined by the test. This five-locus
DNA profile does not match Clayton Dicks—it matches Robin Lovitt. At all five loci the
alleles (bands) that the computer detected are exactly those that would be expected if
Lovitt rather than Dicks was the source of the bloodstain. At one locus (D5S818) there is

18

The authors received a copy of the spreadsheets (along with other information DFS had produced in
discovery) in 2005 from journalist Margaret Edds of the Virginian Pilot. Edds was seeking the first
author’s opinion on the DNA testing in the Lovitt case. DFS had provided a copy of the STaRCall
Speadsheets to Lovitt’s lawyer shortly before the trial. Letter from Deanne F. Dabbs, Program Manager,
Forensic Biology Section, DFS, to Denman A. Rucker, Esq., counsel for Robin Lovitt, dated Sept. 8, 1999,
with attachments (copy on file with authors).
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an additional allele (allele 11) that cannot be accounted for by Lovitt, but it could not
have come from Dicks either. 19
These results provide strong evidence that the bloodstain on Lovitt’s jacket came
from Lovitt himself, not from the victim. The probability that a randomly chosen person
would happen to have a five-locus DNA profile that corresponds with the bands that the
computer detected on the jacket is approximately 1 in 10,000 among Caucasians and 1 in
20,000 among African-Americans.20
The optical density (OD) values of these bands were relatively low compared with
the bands detected on the scissors, which indicates that these bands were relatively faint.
The faintness of the bands may be the reason that Carol Palmer decided to characterize
them as inconclusive. Extremely faint bands can sometimes be spurious—the product of
random “noise” in the system—and therefore may be unreliable data. However, if these
jacket results are “random noise” how did they happen to match up so nicely with the
profile of Robin Lovitt, the owner of the jacket? Monkeys playing with typewriters do
not produce sonnets, and random noise in a DNA test does not produce a five-locus, onein-10,000 DNA match.
As noted earlier, the DFS laboratory protocol leaves the decision to call a band
“inconclusive” entirely to the analyst. It is a subjective judgment. There is no objective
standard. Moreover, analysts are not “blind” to the consequences of their judgment.
Carol Palmer was undoubtedly aware of how her determination would affect the
19

Because each person can contribute at most two alleles at a given locus, finding three alleles at a locus is
generally taken as evidence of a mixture of DNA from more than one person. On the other hand, given the
low OD value it might be a spurious result.
20
The authors computed these frequencies using the standard cumulative probability of inclusion method
based on frequency data from Bruce Budowle, et al., Population Data on the Thirteen CODIS Core Short
Tandem Repeat Loci in African Americans, U.S. Caucasians, Hispanics, Bahamians, Jamaicans, and
Trinidadians. 44 J.FORENSIC SCI. 1277 (1999).
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prosecution’s case. Under these circumstances there is a real possibility that she was
influenced, perhaps entirely unconsciously, to shape her conclusions in a direction
helpful to the state.21 Palmer could not have been relying solely on the optical density of
the bands, as measured objectively by the computer. Three of the jacket bands (CSF1PO
alleles 10 and 12, and vWA allele 17) have higher OD values than the weakest band on
the scissors (allele 13 at locus D16S539).

Yet all of the jacket bands were deemed

“inconclusive” and all of the scissors bands were reported.22
In sum, the DNA test results on the jacket have strong probative value for
showing that the bloodstain came from Lovitt rather than Dicks. The failure to report
these findings deprived the jury of an important piece of evidence that would have
undermined a key point in the prosecution’s case.
Next, let’s consider the DNA test results on the scissors. While the jury heard
nothing about the ten alleles that link Lovitt to the stain on the jacket, they heard a great
deal about the single allele (allele 17 at locus vWA) that reportedly linked him to the
scissors. The presence of three alleles at locus vWA indicates that the stain on the
scissors contains a mixture of DNA from more than one person. Every allele in the
profile except for the 17 allele at locus vWA corresponds with the profile of the victim,
Clayton Dicks. So the stain on the scissors appears to be a mixture of DNA from Dicks
and another person who has vWA allele 17.
21

See, D.M. Risinger, M. Saks, W. Thompson & R. Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion. 90 CAL.L.REV 1
(2002).
22
In the absence of objective standards for interpretation, the failure of the lab to use blind procedures
leaves the analyst open to the charge that her judgments was influence by observer effects, also known as
examiner bias, see Risinger, et al., supra note 19. In other words, the failure to use procedures that are
either objective or blind, promotes suspicion that the analyst either consciously or unconsciously shaped
her conclusions to fit the government’s theory of the case. It is reasonable to wonder, for example, whether
the analyst would have chosen to report the weak results on the jacket had they matched Clayton Dicks
rather than Robin Lovitt.
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During the trial, much was made of the fact that Lovitt has vWA allele 17.
Palmer initially stated that she could “make no conclusion” as to whether Lovitt was
included or excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA on the scissors.23 When
pressed by the prosecutor, however, she testified that she could have eliminated Lovitt
had he not possessed the 17 allele. This led to the following exchange:
Q: So you were not able to eliminate him in doing this process totally?
A: I was not able to draw a conclusion, therefore, not able to eliminate him
either.24
An expert called by the defendant also conceded that because Lovitt possesses the
“extra” 17 allele he could not be eliminated as a possible contributor to the scissors stain.
The defense expert testified that only 19% of African-Americans possess this particular
allele and hence that 81% of that population could be eliminated as possible contributors.
There are several problems with the evidence that was used to link Lovitt to the
scissors. First, the defense expert provided an incorrect statistic about the percentage of
the population who possess the 17 allele at locus vWA. Based on population data
published by the FBI, it can be determined that about 33% of African-Americans, 46% of
Caucasians and 40% of Hispanics possess that allele.25 In other words, the defense expert
significantly understated the frequency of this allele, making the fact that Lovitt
happened to have the allele appear more significant than it actually was.26

23

RT p. 1178, Lines 18-21.
RT p. 1183, Lines 3-6.
25
Bruce Budowle, et al., Population Data on the Thirteen CODIS Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci in
African Americans, U.S. Caucasians, Hispanics, Bahamians, Jamaicans, and Trinidadians. 44 J.FORENSIC
SCI. 1277 (1999).
26
The defense expert appears to have made an elementary error in Genetics. The figure that he reported
appears to have come directly from a table of data on the “allele frequency” of the vWA 17 allele.
However, the “allele frequency” represents the percentage of all vWA alleles that are 17. As any student of
genetics should know, the “allele frequency” is not the same as the percentage of people in a population
24
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A second problem with the theory that Lovitt’s DNA was on the scissors is that
Lovitt possesses eleven alleles that were not found on the scissors. The experts who
testified assumed that Lovitt might have contributed too little DNA for these other alleles
to be detected. It is generally understood that when the quantity of DNA from a
contributor is extremely limited, DNA tests sometimes fail to detect a complete profile.27
Most commonly the test fails to detect any alleles from a contributor at a particular locus,
a phenomenon known as locus dropout. This phenomenon probably explains the failure
of the test to detect Lovitt’s alleles on the jacket at locus TPOX, THO1 and D16S539.
This phenomenon could possibly explain the failure to detect any of Lovitt’s alleles on
the scissors at any locus other than vWA, although there is no particular reason to expect
vWA (rather than some other locus) to be the last or only locus at which a contributor’s
alleles are detected.
A further problem with the theory that Lovitt’s DNA is on the scissors is that only
one of Lovitt’s two alleles at locus vWA was detected. Generally, if a contributor has
two alleles at a locus, a DNA test will either detect both of them or neither of them.
Finding one of two alleles, a phenomenon known as “allelic dropout” or “within locus
dropout” is less common, although it sometimes happens.28 When allelic dropout occurs,
a random process controls which of the two alleles is lost.29

who possess the allele. Because each person inherits two alleles, one from each parent, the percentage of a
population that will possess a particular allele is 1-(1-f)2, where f represents the allele frequency.
27
See Butler, supra note x, at 167-70.
28
As a point of comparison, notice that there is no evidence of allelic dropout on the jacket stain, only locus
dropout.
29
As Butler, supra note x, at 68, explains, “When amplifying very low levels of DNA template, a
phenomenon known as stochastic fluctuation can occur. Stochastic effects, which are an unequal sampling
of the two alleles present from a heterozygous individual, result when only a few DNA molecules are used
to initiate PCR.”
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In summary, while it is conceivable that Lovitt’s DNA could account for the
“extra allele” at locus vWA, this theory requires the occurrence of a series of unlikely
underlying events: there must have been allelic dropout at locus vWA; the allelic dropout
must have caused the loss of Lovitt’s 16 allele rather than the 17 allele; and Lovitt’s
alleles must also have dropped out at every locus except vWA. So the theory that the
secondary contributor is Lovitt is rather implausible. The alternative theory—that the
secondary contributor is someone else—may actually be more plausible given that the 17
allele at locus vWA is found in over one third of the human population. The alternative
theory does not require that there have been allelic drop-out at locus vWA because the
secondary contributor could have genotype 11,17 or 14,17 or 17,17.30
C. An Even Closer Look at the DNA Evidence: Analyzing the Probative Value of the
Scissors Match With Likelihood Ratios31
Scholars sometimes gauge the probative value of evidence for distinguishing two
hypotheses by computing a likelihood ratio (LR).32 In this section we will present a
formal analysis of the value of the DNA evidence that was used to link Lovitt to the
30

If the secondary contributor had one of these genotypes, only a single “extra allele” (allele 17) would be
apparent beyond the two alleles of the primary contributor. The primary contributor’s alleles (11 and 14)
would mask (cover) the other allele of a secondary contributor with genotype 11,17 or 14,17. If the
secondary contributor had genotype 17,17 (a homozygote) only a single 17 allele would appear.
Approximately 5.8% of African-Americans, 12% of Caucasians and 7.5% of Hispanics have one of these
three genotypes. The frequency of people with one of the three genotypes in the general population, taking
no account of race, is about 11%.
31
[Note to editors: This section could be moved into a technical appendix to improve the flow of the paper]
32
The likelihood ratio is the ratio of two conditional probabilities: the probability of the evidence given that
one hypothesis is true and the probability of the evidence given that the other hypothesis is true. There is a
long tradition in evidence scholarship of using the likelihood ratio to describe the probative value of
evidence. See D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value, 27 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 645, 649 (2003); Richard O. Lempert, Modeling Relevance 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025
(1977); Tillers & Schum, supra note 14, at 833; BERNARD ROBERTSON & G.A. VIGNAUX, INTERPRETING
EVIDENCE: EVALUATING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 17 (1995); COLIN G.G. AITKEN,
STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 42 (1995). One need not know
which of two hypotheses is true to compute a likelihood ratio. One need only be able to estimate how much
more probable the evidence would be under one of the hypotheses than the other.
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scissors, using likelihood ratios. Based on this analysis we will argue that the DNA
evidence had little or no value for proving Lovitt’s DNA was on the scissors and may in
fact have proved the opposite. Readers who are already convinced on this point, and
readers who have no interest in mathematical characterizations of evidence, are welcome
to skip this section.
Let’s consider the likelihood ratio for distinguishing two hypotheses: H1—that
Lovitt is the secondary contributor to the DNA on the scissors, and H2—that someone
else (a random person) is the secondary contributor. The evidence we will consider, E, is
that a 17 allele was detected at locus vWA that could not have come from the primary
contributor. Under this formulation, the value of E for proving distinguishing H1 and H2
depends on the likelihood ratio p(E|H1)/p(E|H2). To the extent this likelihood ratio
exceeds 1.00, the evidence, E, supports H1; to the extent the LR is less than 1.00, the
evidence, E, supports H2.
The term p(E|H1) designates the probability of observing a 17 allele at vWA if
Lovitt is the secondary contributor. Although this probability is not zero, it cannot be
very high because Lovitt has genotype 16,17 and no 16 was detected. As already noted,
the loss of one of two alleles from a contributor (allelic dropout) is a relatively
uncommon event. For purpose of discussion, let’s assume the probability of this event is
0.30 or 30%.33 We must also take into account that it was the 16 rather than the 17 allele

33

Of course any estimate of p(E|H1) is somewhat speculative. We base our estimate of 0.30 on the
general observation that loss of one of two alleles from a contributor is relatively uncommon. If a
contributor has two alleles, the test will typically either detect both of them or neither of them. As an
illustration, consider the DNA profile shown in Table 1 for the sample from Lovitt’s jacket (based on the
StaRCall worksheet). At five loci, the test detected both of Lovitt’s alleles. At three loci the test detected
neither of Lovitt’s alleles. However, there is no locus at which the test detected just one of Lovitt’s two
alleles. If the frequency of single-allele drop-out were 30% or higher, it seems likely that we would see an
example of it in the jacket sample where the lab was clearly working at the very threshold of its ability to
detect limited quantities of DNA. As discussed below, we think the value of p(E|H1) may actually be
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that was lost. Because allelic dropout is caused by a stochastic (random) process,34 let’s
assume the conditional probability of this event, given that allelic dropout occurs, is 50%
or 0.50. Accordingly, we will assume p(E|H1) = 0.30 x 0.50 = 0.15.
To compute the denominator of the LR, which is p(E|H2), we must consider the
probability of getting a 17 allele if the secondary contributor was a random person other
than Robin Lovitt. This probability also depends in part on whether allelic dropout
occurred. If allelic dropout did not occur, then the secondary contributor must have one
of three possible genotypes: 11,17 or 14,17 or 17,17. As noted earlier, about 11 percent
of the population has one of these genotypes, so p(E|H2) is about 0.11 if allelic dropout
did not occur.
Because we assumed allelic dropout might have occurred when we computed
p(E|H1), we must also consider that possibility when computing p(E|H2). If one of two
alleles from the secondary contributor “dropped out, ” then only one of the secondary
contributor’s alleles would be detected. The probability that this detected allele would
be a 17 is equal to the “allele frequency,” which is approximately 24% in the general
population.35 So p(E|H2) is about 0.24 if allelic dropout did occur.
Now that we have estimates of p(E|H2) under the two possible assumptions about
whether allelic dropout occurred, we can combine those estimates by taking a weighted
average—weighting each estimate according to the probability that allelic drop-out
occurred. We will assume, as before, that there is a probability of 0.70 that dropout did

much lower than 0.30, but we adopt that value as a conservative estimate for purpose of illustration. The
implications of alternative estimates are considered below.
34
Butler, supra note 26.
35
According to FBI population studies, the “allele frequency” of the 17 allele at locus vWA is
approximately 18% among African-Americans, 26% among Caucasians, and 22% among Hispanics. See
Budowle et al., supra note 23.
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not occur, and a probability of 0.30 that it did occur. Hence, p(E|H2) = (0.70 x 0.11) +
(0.30 x 0.24) = 0.149, or 14.9%.
Based on these calculations, the value of the likelihood ratio, p(E|H1)/p(E|H2) is
0.15/0.149 = 1.0067, which rounds off to 1.0. This likelihood ratio indicates the
evidence, E, has virtually no probative value for distinguishing the two hypotheses.
Because E is as likely under H1 as under H2, the occurrence of E tells us nothing about
whether H1 or H2 occurred.
The only contestable assumption we made in computing the likelihood ratio was
the 30% probability of allelic dropout.36 However, close examination of our likelihood
ratio (LR) model shows that LR is not very sensitive to the accuracy of this assumption.
Under our model, the LR will increase with increases in the probability of allelic dropout.
However, even if we make the unrealistic assumption that allelic dropout was inevitable
(i.e., the probability of allelic dropout is 1.0), the resulting likelihood ratio increases only
to approximately 2.1.37 This LR suggests the value of the evidence, E, under the most
favorable possible assumptions (which unrealistically maximize its value), is comparable
to the value of a “match” between Lovitt and the bloodstain on a genetic characteristic
found in approximately half of the human population.38

36

We think the actual probability is unlikely to be higher than 30% and may well be much lower. If the
drop-out probability is indeed lower than 30%, as we suspect, it means that the evidence, E, supports H2—
in other words, the DNA evidence supports the theory that someone other than Lovitt was the secondary
donor.
37
Under that assumption, p(E|H1) = 0.5 and p(E|H2) = 0.24, hence LR = 0.5/0.24 = 2.08.
38
The jury was undoubtedly left with the impression that the value of the DNA evidence for incriminating
Lovitt was much greater. The defendant’s own expert testified (incorrectly) that 81% of the population
could be eliminated as a possible source of the vWA 17 allele, and that Lovitt could not.
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If, on the other hand, we assume (more realistically) that the probability of allelic
dropout is only 10%, then the LR drops to 0.41.39 In other words, under this assumption,
the evidence, E, is more than twice as likely if someone other than Lovitt was the
secondary contributor than if Lovitt was the secondary contributor, which means the
evidence is exculpatory: it supports the theory that Lovitt was not the secondary
contributor.

D. Did Robin Lovitt Receive a Fair Trial?
When they retired to the deliberation room to decide Robin Lovitt’s fate, the
jurors undoubtedly had mistaken impressions about two key facts in the case. They
surely thought it likely that DNA from Lovitt was on the scissors and that the victim’s
blood was on Lovitt’s jacket. In fact, as we have shown, the evidence provides little or
no support for the theory that Lovitt’s DNA was on the scissors—it may actually show
the opposite. Furthermore, there is strong evidence (that the jury never heard) that the
blood on Lovitt’s jacket came from Lovitt himself, and not from the murder victim.
Given the weakness of the other evidence in the case, it is by no means clear that the jury
would have convicted Lovitt, had they known the truth about the DNA evidence.
Did Lovitt receive a fair trial? We think most people viewing this trial through
the lens of everyday morality would conclude that he did not. Indeed, we think our
analysis raises serious concerns about whether the jury reached the correct verdict.
Consequently, we think that an effective system of post-trial review should have
recognized the problems with the DNA evidence and provided a remedy. At a minimum,

39

Under the assumption of a 10% chance of allelic drop-out, p(E|H1) = 0.1 x 0.5 = 0.05 and p(E|H2) = (.90
x .11) + (0.10 x 0.24) = 0.123, hence LR = 0.05/0.123 = 0.406.
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the issue should have been identified and its implications should have been carefully
considered and discussed. As we will show in the next section, however, that did not
happen. Although Lovitt was represented by able counsel and received the full panoply
of post-conviction consideration afforded those who are sentenced to death, the courts
that participated in this process of review never directly recognized or acknowledged the
problems that we have identified.
II. Direct Appeal and Habeas Corpus Proceedings
A. Direct Appeal
The Virginia Supreme Court heard Lovitt’s direct appeal of the capital murder
conviction and death sentence in 2000.40 In the appeal Lovitt raised a plethora of issues41
but made no claim of any unfairness in the presentation of DNA evidence.42 The
Supreme Court found no reversible error in any judgments of the trial court and therefore
affirmed the conviction and death sentence.
Lovitt next petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari.
At this stage, Kirkland and Ellis, one of the nation’s premier law firms, which had taken
the case pro bono, was representing Lovitt. The petition focused on the trial judge’s
decision to admit evidence of Lovitt’s prior criminal behavior during the sentencing
40

Lovitt v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 260 Va. 497, 537 S.E.2d 866 (2000). Lovitt was represented at this
stage by his trial counsel and another Virginia lawyer.
41
Lovitt raised a number of procedural challenges to Virginia’s capital trial procedures that the court
dismissed in a pro forma manner by citing to previous cases in which the same challenges had been denied.
The court gave more attention to a few issues, such as Lovitt’s claims that the trial judge had erred in
failing to strike a prospective juror for bias, in allowing police officers to vouch for the “good reputation for
truthfulness” of the jailhouse informant, but ultimately found no merit to any of these arguments.
42
Lovitt raised only one issue on direct appeal that related in any way to DNA analyst Carol Palmer. When
cross-examining Palmer, Lovitt’s trial lawyer asked whether she would have expected to find blood from
the victim on Lovitt’s clothing, if Lovitt had stabbed the victim. After Palmer responded that she would not
necessarily have expected to find blood, Lovitt’s lawyer sought permission of the court to impeach her by
taking the stand himself and testifying that she had given a different answer when he had asked her the
same question before trial. The trial judge refused to allow the lawyer to testify.
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phase of the trial, including alleged criminal acts for which he had not been convicted
(unadjudicated criminal conduct). The petition raised no claim of any unfairness related
to the presentation of DNA evidence. The United State Supreme Court denied the
petition.43
B. State Habeas Proceedings
After the denial of Lovitt’s direct appeal, the law firm of Kirkland and Ellis
continued to represent him. His counsel included prominent lawyers, most notably
former United States Solicitor General and Watergate Special Prosecutor Kenneth Starr, a
senior partner at the firm. Robert E. Lee, an experienced appellate lawyer with the
Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, also assisted on the case. Lovitt’s legal
team devoted considerable energy and resources to investigating the case and, in
November 2001, filed a state petition for a writ of habeas corpus.44
The petition alleged three general violations of Lovitt’s due process rights: the
state had destroyed the remaining biological evidence from the case, preventing any
further DNA testing; the prosecution had suppressed exculpatory evidence; and Lovitt
had received inadequate assistance of counsel at trial. The Virginia Supreme Court
entered an order directing that the Circuit Court of Arlington County conduct an
evidentiary hearing on these issues.
At the two-day evidentiary hearing in June 2002, over twenty witnesses testified.
During this hearing, Lovitt’s lawyers called two witnesses to testify about the DNA
evidence. Based on his review of the laboratory report, laboratory notes, gel images and

43

534 U.S. 815 (2001).
Robin McKennel Lovitt v. Warden, Sussex 1 State Prison, 266 Va. 216, 585 S.E.2d 801 (2003)[hereafter
Lovitt v. Warden].

44
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STaRCall Worksheets, Dr. George Riley, an expert in forensic DNA testing, expressed
opinions about the evidence that are largely consistent with the views expressed in this
article. He expressed the opinion that additional testing of the stains on the scissors
“could and almost certainly would have demonstrated that the genetic material on the
scissors could not have come from Mr. Lovitt…”45 Based on the data in the STaRCall
worksheet, Riley concluded that the DNA on the jacket “almost certainly came from Mr.
Lovitt himself.”46 When asked about the prosecutor’s suggestion, in the closing
argument, that there was blood from the victim on Lovitt’s jacket, Riley said “that’s
completely inconsistent with the DNA results seen.”47 With regard to the statistical
frequency of the vWA 17 allele, Riley testified that it is found in 48% of Caucasians,
29% of Blacks and 43% of Hispanics.48
The second DNA witness was Peter Neufeld, co-founder and co-director of the
Innocence Project at the Cardozo Law School in New York City. Neufeld was called
primarily as an expert in post-conviction DNA testing to testify that the biological
evidence that the state had destroyed was relevant and material to Lovitt’s case.
However, Neufeld also testified that the DNA results from the scissors had been
presented at trial in a manner “that is grossly misleading to the jury.”49 He expressed the
opinion that it was unethical for the prosecutor to suggest during closing arguments that
the bloodstain on Lovitt’s jacket came from the victim when the prosecutor had “raw data
45

RT Vol I, p. 34, June 18, 2002. Dr. Riley was clearly skeptical of the allelic dropout theory and thought
the absence of Lovitt’s 16 allele was strong evidence that Lovitt could not have been the secondary
contributor. His views on this point appear to be more favorable to Lovitt than the views of the authors of
this article.
46
Id. at p. 34-35.
47
Id. at p. 54, lines 14-15.
48
Unlike the defense witness who testified at trial, Dr. Riley computed these frequencies correctly. The
numbers he presented differ slightly from the numbers presented in this article because he relied on a
Commonwealth of Virginia database rather than the FBI database used by the authors.
49
RT. Vol I, p. 85.
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in [his] hands which tells you that the bloodstain matches Mr. Lovitt.”50 Thus, the record
created during the post-conviction evidentiary hearing established the basic facts from
which one could reasonably conclude that the jury was misled about the value of the
DNA evidence and hence that Lovitt did not get a fair trial.
Although this evidence was in the record, it was not directly acknowledged or
discussed in any subsequent court opinion. Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit
judge submitted to the state Supreme Court a written report stating findings of fact and
recommended conclusions of law. On September 12, 2003, the Supreme Court of
Virginia accepted the circuit judge’s recommendations and dismissed Lovitt’s habeas
petition. The Supreme Court’s lengthy opinion said very little about the DNA evidence
and did not directly address any of the issues we have raised here about the way it was
presented. Instead, the opinion focused on the three major legal challenges that Lovitt’s
counsel had raised in their briefs.51
1. Destruction of Evidence
It was undisputed that the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Arlington
County (hereafter “Clerk”) had drafted an order authorizing the destruction of all the
exhibits received in evidence in the Lovitt trial, including the scissors and Lovitt’s jacket.
A circuit judge signed the order and the evidence was destroyed in late May of 2001.52

50

Id, at p. 123.
See, Petitioner’s Opening Brief in Lovitt v. William True, Warden Sussex State Prison [hereafter
“Opening Brief”],
52
The Chief Deputy Clerk testified that he was unaware of the statute and thought he was authorized to
destroy trial exhibits after the conviction was affirmed. At the time the evidence was destroyed, however,
Lovitt’s direct appeal had not been affirmed. His petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court
was still pending. The Clerk testified that he sought to destroy the evidence in order to create additional
space in the clerk’s office evidence room. Two deputy court clerks testified that they had advised the
Clerk, who was their immediate superior, that he should not destroy the evidence in Lovitt’s case because it
was a capital case and Lovitt had not been executed. The destruction of evidence violated a longstanding
state policy that no evidence is destroyed in a capital case before the defendant is put to death. The
51
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This destruction of evidence violated a Virginia statute that took effect on May 2, 2001
that specifically requires in capital cases that the state “store, preserve and retain” any
“human biological evidence” until the sentence is executed.53
Lovitt’s lawyers argued that the state’s intentional destruction of the biological
evidence violated Lovitt’s right of due process by depriving him of the opportunity for a
meaningful habeas review.54 Interestingly, Lovitt’s lawyers did not argue that the
biological evidence was exculpatory, only that it was potentially exculpatory because
further testing might have helped Lovitt to prove his claim of actual innocence.55 They
also argued that destruction of the evidence undermined Lovitt’s ability to prove his
claim that “his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to order additional DNA testing.”56
The Virginia Supreme Court found these arguments unconvincing, saying that
Lovitt had “failed to present authority to support his claim that habeas corpus relief is the
proper remedy for inability to obtain further testing.”57 The major authority Lovitt
presented was Arizona v. Youngblood,58 which established the principle that a state’s bad
faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence violates due process. The Virginia
Supreme Court questioned whether the principle established in Youngblood applies to
post-conviction (rather than pre-trial) destruction of evidence and found the case
inapplicable anyway because “the record lacks any evidence that an agent of the
Attorney General of Virginia acknowledged that the Lovitt case was the only capital case in modern times
in which the state of Virginia had destroyed evidence before the defendant’s execution.
53
Virginia Code Section 19.2-270.4:1.
54
Id. at 11-21.
55
This is an important distinction because, as explained below, it is a clear violation of due process for a
state to destroy “exculpatory” evidence, regardless of whether the state’s agents act in good or bad faith.
With respect to potentially exculpatory evidence, the defendant must show the state’s agents acted in “bad
faith” to establish a due process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). Potentially
exculpatory evidence includes evidence “of which no more can be said than that it could have been
subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” 488 U.S. at 51-57.
56
Id. at 13.
57
Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. at 239.
58
488 U.S. 51 (1989). See also, California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).
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Commonwealth acted in bad faith…”59 As the Court conceived the issue, “the presence
or absence of bad faith by the state depends on whether agents of the state had knowledge
of the exculpatory value of the evidence when it was lost or destroyed.” Although Lovitt
had presented evidence that the Chief Clerk acted illegally and in violation of
longstanding policy, and that the Clerk knew he was ordering the destruction of
biological evidence from a capital case, according to the Court Lovitt had not established
that “an agent of the Commonwealth had knowledge of the exculpatory value of the trial
exhibits at the time they were destroyed.” The Court went on to say that even if the Clerk
had known that the exhibits contained biological evidence that could have been subject to
additional testing, “such awareness would not have met the constitutional standard of
materiality under Youngblood because Lovitt can assert no more than the mere
possibility that further testing could have exculpated him.”60
2. Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence
Lovitt’s second line of attack on his conviction concerned alleged Brady
violations61—i.e., the failure of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence. None of
the alleged violations concerned DNA evidence. However, these claims are worth a
quick review here because they highlight the weakness of the state’s case against Lovitt.
During the evidentiary hearing, Lovitt’s lawyers presented evidence that prosecutors had
failed to disclose three pieces of evidence: (1) that the medical examiner had concluded
59

266 Va. at 242.
Id. In fact, Lovitt had asserted considerably more than the mere possibility that further testing would be
exculpatory. Lovitt’s opening brief states: “…because the evidence was destroyed, Mr. Lovitt has been
clearly prejudiced in his attempts to prove that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to order
additional DNA testing. DNA expert Dr. George Riley has testified that such testing would likely prove
conclusively that blood on Mr. Lovitt’s jacket was Mr. Lovitt’s, not the victim’s, as the Commonwealth
argued at trial.” Opening Brief, at 13. The Virginia Supreme Court did not mention or acknowledge Dr.
Riley’s testimony.
61
See, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley
514 U.S. 419 (1995).
60

Thompson & Dioso-Villa

26

that the fatal wounds to the victim could not have been caused by scissors as small as
those that were introduced at trial as the murder weapon; 62 (2) that the jailhouse
informant who testified against Lovitt had been a police informant in four previous
cases;63 and (3) that the jailhouse informant had made statements to prosecutors before
trial that were inconsistent with his trial testimony.64 The Court ultimately concluded that
the withheld evidence, with one exception, was not actually exculpatory (within the
meaning of Brady). The exception was evidence that the jailhouse informant had
received a benefit for acting as an informant in one previous case. However, the Court
concluded that the failure to disclose that one item of exculpatory evidence was not
material because the jurors’ ignorance of that evidence “did not place Lovitt’s trial in a
posture that would undermine confidence in the verdict.” 65
Once again, our main point in recounting these arguments is to note that they miss
what we see as the major flaw in the trial. The Court never considered whether the
misleading and inaccurate presentation of the DNA evidence might have “placed Lovitt’s
trial in a posture that would undermine confidence in the verdict.”

62

The police had asked the medical examiner to compare two pairs of scissors found in the pool hall with
the victim’s wounds. The medical examiner concluded that some of the victim’s wounds were too deep to
be accounted for by either pair of scissors. Lovitt’s lawyers contended that the prosecutors were aware of
this conclusion and were also aware that one of the pairs of scissors shown to the medical examiner was
identical in size to the bloody scissors that were presented to the jury as the murder weapon, but had failed
to disclose this information to the defense.
63
The state acknowledged this fact, but argued that there was only one previous case in which the
prosecutors actually knew the informant had cooperated and the informant had received a benefit or
inducement from the state for doing so. The state argued successfully that prosecutors were not obligated
to disclose information about prior cooperation that they did not know about and that, in the absence of an
inducement, the fact that the informant had previously assisted the police was not exculpatory evidence.
64
Lovitt’s lawyers produced a sworn affidavit from the informant to support this claim, but the state called
the informant to testify in the evidentiary hearing, at which time he recanted and disavowed his statements
in the affidavit.
65
266 Va. at 247.
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3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Lovitt’s lawyers sought to establish that trial counsel had provided
ineffective assistance.66 In the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Lovitt’s lawyers alleged that
trial counsel had been ineffective during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.
They alleged that trial counsel had been deficient on a number of dimensions, including
failure to adequately investigate and expose weaknesses in the DNA evidence and failure
to pursue additional testing of the bloody scissors and Lovitt’s jacket.
During the hearing, one of Lovitt’s trial lawyers, Denman Rucker, testified that he
had made a strategic decision not to question the “inconclusive” DNA test results on the
scissors and jacket. In his view, this strategy had the advantage of allowing defense
counsel to question the adequacy of the state’s proof that Lovitt was the perpetrator while
avoiding the possibility that further testing of the scissors or jacket might yield results
that would further implicate Lovitt in the murder.67
After the evidentiary hearing, Lovitt’s habeas counsel seemed to lose interest in
the claim that trial counsel’s handling of the DNA evidence was deficient—although they
did not formally abandon this claim, they no longer actively argued for it. Instead, they
focused their attention entirely on the alleged failure of trial counsel to perform
adequately during the penalty phase of the trial.68 The Virginia Supreme Court addressed
counsel’s handling of the DNA evidence in a single paragraph that simply recounted

66

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must satisfy the two-part test of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which requires a showing that (1) the counsel’s
performance was deficient relative to reasonable professional standards and (2) that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.
67
This testimony is described Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. at 251.
68
The Opening Brief that they filed with the Virginia Supreme Court included a major section on
ineffective assistance of counsel that focused entirely on penalty-phase issues and said nothing at all about
counsel’s handling of the DNA evidence.
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Rucker’s claim that his approach was the product of a purposeful strategy and found that
this strategy was objectively reasonable.69
The Court analyzed Lovitt’s other allegations concerning inadequate assistance of
counsel at much greater length but ultimately found no merit in any of them. Having thus
disposed of all three of Lovitt’s challenges to his conviction, the Court dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus.
C. Federal Habeas Proceedings
On March 8, 2004, Lovitt’s lawyers filed a petition for habeas corpus in the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking what is known as
collateral review of the case.70 Under standards established by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a federal court can grant relief on
habeas claims that a state supreme court has dismissed on the merits only if the federal
court finds that the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.”71
Lovitt’s lawyers claimed that the Virginia Supreme Court had applied federal law
unreasonably on four major issues. We will review these claims and the court’s
resolution of them briefly. We note at the outset, however, that as with the state habeas
petition, none of these claims addressed the misleading presentation of DNA evidence in
Lovitt’s trial.

69

Id.
They were essentially asking the federal court to determine that the Virginia Supreme Court’s resolution
of the habeas petition had violated Lovitt’s rights under the United States Constitution.
71
28 U.S. C. § 2254(d)
70
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Lovitt’s lawyers first arged that the Virginia Supreme Court had misapplied
Brady v. Maryland when it analyzed the prosecution’s failure to disclose the medical
examiner’s opinion about the murder weapon72 and the jailhouse informant’s history of
cooperation with police. The federal district court reviewed the record on these issues
and declined to find the Virginia Supreme Court had acted unreasonably.73 The federal
district court went on to find that the suppressed evidence, even if viewed collectively,
was not sufficiently material to have affected the verdict, declaring that: “in this court’s
opinion, the Commonwealth’s evidence was strong enough that neither the medical
examiner’s initial scissors opinion nor [the informant’s] prior history of law enforcement
cooperation would substantially have affected its weight or value,” and hence that
“suppression of such evidence still would not undermine confidence in the jury’s
verdict.” 74
Second, Lovitt’s lawyers argued that the prosecutors had engaged in misconduct
by arguing to the jury that the bloody scissors were the murder weapon when they knew

72

The Virginia Supreme Court found that prosecutors had failed to disclose the medical examiner’s opinion
that the victim’s fatal wounds could not have been caused by either of two pairs of scissors from the pool
hall. However, the Court concluded this evidence was not exculpatory “because that opinion related to
scissors that were not introduced into evidence, were not the alleged murder weapon, and were not shown
to be the same size as the murder weapon.” 266 Va. at 245. Lovitt’s lawyers argued that this conclusion
was unreasonable because the record of the evidentiary had shown that one of the two pairs of scissors was
in fact identical in size to the scissors that were the alleged medical weapon and that these scissors had been
given to the medical examiner for the very purpose of determining whether the identical bloody scissors
found behind that pool hall could have been the murder weapon. However Lovitt was not able to persuade
the federal district court that the scissors were identical. Because the bloody scissors that were presented at
trial as the murder weapon had been destroyed, Lovitt had to rely on a photograph of those scissors, taken
next to a ruler, for purposes of size estimation. Although the medical examiner was shown this photograph
during the evidentiary hearing, and had testified that the scissors in the photograph were the same size as
one of the two pairs of scissors she had compared to the victim’s wounds, and were too small to have
caused all of those wounds, the federal district court noted that the medical examiner could measure only
one of the two blades of these scissors. “The other blade she could not measure due to its positioning in the
photograph.” 330 F.Supp.2d at n.6. Thus Lovitt’s constitutional challenge faltered due to his inability to
prove that the two blades of the destroyed scissors were the same length.
73
330 F.Supp at 613-618.
74
330 F.Supp. 2d at 625.
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the medical examiner had concluded it could not have been. They cited Miller v. Pate,75
a case in which the United States Supreme Court vacated the sentence of a state prisoner
because the prosecution had described a pair of stained underwear as the “bloody shorts”
and had repeatedly stated that the shorts were “stained with blood” even though the
prosecutor knew the shorts were stained with paint, not blood. However, the federal
district court held the situation in Lovitt was distinguishable because Lovitt’s prosecutors
had good reason to believe the bloody scissors were the murder weapon, notwithstanding
the contrary opinion of the medical examiner.
Lovitt’s third argument was that the Virginia Supreme Court had unreasonably
applied Arizona v. Youngblood and related cases when it excused the state’s destruction
of the remaining biological evidence. Lovitt’s lawyers argued strenuously that the
Clerk’s illegal destruction of the biological evidence went beyond mere negligence and
constituted “bad faith” within the meaning of the Youngblood standard. They also
emphasized the “materiality” of the destroyed evidence, again citing Dr. Riley’s
statement that additional testing “would likely prove conclusively” that the blood of the
jacket was from Lovitt rather than the victim.76 But the federal district court found that
the Virginia Supreme Court had reasonably construed the Youngblood standard when it
found no evidence of “bad faith.” The court made dismissive comments about the value
of the destroyed evidence, saying:
Petitioners’s current, unsubstantiated assertion—that further testing would
likely prove conclusively, that some of the blood stains identified on certain items
of evidence actually originated from him and not from the vitim—adds gloss to
his argument but little texture to the analysis. Such an argument is analogous to
that rejected in Illinois v. Fisher, wherein the contested evidence provided the
75
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defendant’s “only hope for exoneration.” To meet the Youngblood standard,
more particularity is required.77
As discussed earlier, examination of the state’s DNA test results on the jacket revealed a
1-in-10,000 DNA match with Robin Lovitt. One can only wonder whether the federal
judge would have found that evidence sufficiently “particular” (or sufficiently textured)
had he been told about it.
Lovitt’s fourth and final argument was that the Virginia Supreme Court had
unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington when it rejected Lovitt’s claim that his
trial counsel had been ineffective. Once again, the brief filed by Lovitt’s lawyers focused
exclusively on the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel during the penalty phase of the
capital trial. They offered no arguments about trial counsels investigation or presentation
of DNA evidence. The federal district court found that the Supreme Court of Virginia
had acted reasonably in denying Lovitt’s claims of ineffective assistance.
Having found no merit in any of Lovitt’s claims, the federal district court
dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
Lovitt next appealed the dismissal of his petition to the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which issued an opinion affirming the District
Court’s ruling on April 6, 2005.78 Lovitt’s lawyers argued that the district court had
“erred by mistaking deference for a rubber stamp” and in so doing had “overlooked the
Virginia Supreme Court’s unreasonable determinations of law and fact” on the four
issues Lovitt had raised. The Fourth Circuit responded by reiterating the conclusions of
the federal district court and expressing agreement with them.
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The Circuit Court’s opinion adopts a rather weary tone, suggesting that the case
has been reviewed so thoroughly already that no important issues could be left:
[Lovitt’s] challenges to his conviction and sentence … have been heard by
many courts. The Supreme Court of Virginia rendered two thorough and
conscientious opinions in his case—one on direct appeal and one on habeas. The
state habeas court in Arlington also treated Lovitt’s claims with care, holding a
two-day evidentiary hearing and authoring detailed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Finally, the federal district court again reviewed Lovitt’s
claims, and dismissed them in a meticulous and lengthy opinion.
This case is a good example of the care with which state courts should treat
capital cases. We think the Virginia Supreme Court properly resolved Lovitt’s
claims. Even if that were not the case, however, we could not begin to say that it
unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court law.79
From our perspective, having seen that there were major problems with the
presentation of DNA evidence at trial that were never addressed by any of these
reviewing courts, these statements ring hollow. Indeed, this passage seems ironic. If this
case is a good example of the care with the state of Virginia tries capital defendants, one
can only wonder how many other capital defendants received unfair trials.
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the Fourth Circuit, the state wasted little
time scheduling Lovitt for execution. The execution date was set for July 11, 2005.
However, on June 28, 2005 Lovitt’s lawyers filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. This Petition raised only three issues: trial counsel’s
allegedly inadequate investigation of penalty phase issue, the state’s destruction of the
trial exhibits, and the prosecution’s failure to disclose the medical examiner’s opinion
about the scissors. In each instance, Lovitt argued that the Fourth Circuit had applied the
law incorrectly. Lovitt’s lawyers also asked for a stay of execution to allow the petition
to be heard. The U.S. Supreme Court issued the stay less than five hours before the
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execution was scheduled.80 However, the Supreme Court later declined to hear the case,
summarily denying Lovitt’s petition on October 3, 2005. The state thereupon
rescheduled Lovitt’s execution for November 30, 2005.
III The Clemency Petition and Expert Review Panel
Having exhausted all judicial remedies, Lovitt’s final option was a petition for
clemency to the governor of Virginia. On July 7, 2005, Lovitt’s lawyers filed a petition
asking governor Mark Warner to commute Lovitt’s sentence to life in prison. The
clemency petition largely focused on the same issues raised in the state and federal
habeas petitions, but it included some new elements.
The destruction of biological samples was given special emphasis because the
quality of DNA testing by the Virginia Department of Forensic Science (DFS) had
recently been called into question after serious errors came to light in another capital
case, that of Earl Washington, Jr.81 In April 2005, a professional organization known as
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors—Laboratory Accreditation Board
(ASCLD-LAB) had issued a scathing report finding serious errors in the DFS work in the
Washington case and calling for a broader review to determine whether these DNA
testing problems were endemic.82 Governor Warner thereafter appointed a panel of
experts to conduct a broader review of DFS DNA testing, including a review of all DNA
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testing that had been performed in capital cases (including the Lovitt case).83 On July 8,
2005, three days before Lovitt’s scheduled execution, one of the members of the expert
panel, Arthur J. Eisenberg, wrote a letter to the governor that stated:
Please be advised that all members of the scientific review team have now
completed our review of the [DFS] file, data and laboratory notes involved in the
[Lovitt] case. We conclude that the case contains no technical procedural errors
or deviations from accepted protocol that may have substantially affected the
integrity of the results in that case. Similarly, in our view, the case contains no
interpretive conclusions that are not scientifically supported.84
At the time Eisenberg wrote this letter, however, neither he nor any other member
of the expert panel had reviewed transcripts of the expert testimony in the Lovitt case.
They were basing their conclusion solely on the DFS laboratory reports,85 which had
stated that the results of the DNA testing were “inconclusive.” As already discussed, the
problem with the DNA evidence in this case does not lie in the laboratory report but in
the way the test results were presented in court. The laboratory report does not say that
Lovitt’s DNA was found on the murder weapon. It quite properly expressed no
conclusion on this point. Yet the jury heard testimony and argument that the DNA results
did show DNA consistent with Lovitt’s on the murder weapon. The expert panel was
also unaware of the double standard applied by the government in telling the jury about
“inconclusive” results that supported Lovitt’s guilt while failing to present the more
convincing “inconclusive” results that supported his innocence. Reasonable people can
differ about what standards are appropriate for distinguishing “conclusive” from
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“inconclusive” DNA test results, but no reasonable person can believe that different
standards should apply depending on whether the results support or contradict the
government’s position in a criminal prosecution. Because the expert panel viewed the
test results in isolation, without considering how those results were presented and used in
the trial, they failed to see the whole picture and their report is of little value in assessing
the fairness of Lovitt’s trial. Nevertheless, the expert report was apparently taken as the
final word on this issue by the governor’s office.
An issue raised for the first time during the clemency proceedings was whether
the “inconclusive” results reported by the state DFS might be clarified through
examination of DFS computer files. As noted earlier, a computer-operated scanning
device detected the “bands” produced by the DNA tests in the Lovitt case. The scanned
images of the bands, and the computer files showing the optical density (“OD”) of the
bands, had been maintained by the laboratory, and thus presumably were available for
further analysis. Lovitt’s lawyers submitted a declaration (prepared by one of the authors
of this article) that explained that new analytic techniques are now available that might
allow a more definitive assessment of which “bands” constitute reliable data.86 Lovitt’s
lawyers had asked the state to provide copies of the electronic files, but the state had
refused.87 When asked about the state’s unwillingness to disclose these potentially
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enlightening computer files, a spokesperson for the governor cited the findings of the
expert panel and said their review of the case was sufficient.88
The stay of execution issued by the U.S. Supreme Court on July 11, 2005 gave his
advocates additional time to rally public support for clemency. Groups including the
Innocence Project, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, the National Coalition to
Abolish the Death Penalty, Amnesty international and other civil liberty and religious
leaders petitioned to Warner for clemency in Lovitt’s case.
Additionally, one of the nation’s most prominent forensic DNA scientists, Dr.
Mitchell Holland of Pennsylvania State University,89 sent a letter to governor offering an
extensive critique of the DNA evidence that had been used to convict Lovitt.90 Holland’s
critique was entirely consistent with the analysis of the DNA evidence offered in this
article. He argued that it is “quite possible that the jury was misled” by the testimony and
argument that linked Lovitt to the bloody scissors, he identified the error in the defense
expert’s statistical computations, and he criticized the DFS for failing to report the low
level alleles on the jacket, saying “it is important that any information available to the
laboratory be used to benefit the defendant.” He argued that the conclusions of Arthur
Eisenberg and the expert panel were irrelevant because the expert panel had not
examined the manner in which the DNA evidence was presented in court. Finally,
Holland asked for an opportunity to review the “original electronic data” collected by
DFS in the case, agreeing that review of the computer files might help clarify whether the
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test results on the jacket should really have been deemed “inconclusive.” He offered to
travel to the DFS laboratory at his own expense in order to do so.
On November 29, 2005, one day before Lovitt’s scheduled execution, Governor
Warner commuted his death sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. According to the governor’s press release he granted clemency because the
Clerk’s improper destruction of evidence had prevented post-conviction re-testing of the
biological evidence.91 He considered the destruction of the physical evidence as an
“extraordinary circumstance that requires executive intervention to reaffirm public
confidence in our justice system.” According to the governor, “in this case, the actions of
an agent of the Commonwealth, in a manner contrary to the express direction of the law,
comes at the expense of a defendant facing society’s most severe and final sanction. The
Commonwealth must ensure that every time this ultimate sanction is carried out, it is
done fairly.”
One would hope, of course, that every time a life sentence is carried out it is also
"done fairly." If Lovitt's conviction was unfair, the appropriate remedy is a new trial, not
a reduction in sentence. An unfair legal process that leads to a life sentence might be
somewhat less offensive than one that leads to an execution, but it is still offensive.
The governor's press release, which was his only public statement on the matter,
did not specifically address the claim that Lovitt received an unfair trial on the issue of
guilt or innocence due to biased and misleading testimony about "inconclusive" DNA
tests. However, the governor stated that he “found no fault with the judgment of the
jury, or with prosecutors and defense counsel.” By implication, then, the governor
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considered Lovitt’s trial fair enough (at least for a life sentence) notwithstanding the loss
of the biological evidence.
IV. Virginia’s Forensic Science Board and Scientific Advisory Committee
In response to the scandal over the mistyping of DNA evidence in the Earl
Washington case, the Virginia Assembly passed legislation in 2005 creating a Forensic
Science Board and a Scientific Advisory Committee to oversee operations of the state’s
Department of Forensic Science.92 The Scientific Advisory Committee is composed of
experts in relevant scientific disciplines.93 Among its duties are to “review and make
recommendations to the Director of the Department and the Forensic Science Board
concerning: … guidelines for the presentation of results in court.” The statute also
provides that “[u]pon request of the Director of the Department, the Forensic Science
Board, or the Governor, the Committee shall review analytical work, reports, and
conclusions of scientists employed by the Department.”
Virginia is one of several states that have created oversight bodies to monitor the
operation of state forensic laboratories.94 This administrative oversight function
potentially creates an independent mechanism for examining problems with the use of
scientific evidence, such as those that occurred in the Lovitt case. As with judicial
oversight, however, the ability of such bodies to deal with these problems may be less
than ideal. As it turned out, the Lovitt case provided an early test of the ability of the
Virginia Forensic Science Board to deal forthrightly with problems in scientific evidence
in the state.
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In Janurary 2006, the Virginia Forensic Science Board received a request to have
the Scientific Advisory Committee examine the DNA evidence in the Lovitt case and the
way that evidence was presented to the jury.95 However, the Board refused to have the
Committee examine the case. In a letter explaining this decision, the Chair of the Board,
S. Randolph Sengel,96 contended that the manner in which scientific evidence is
presented in court is not within the purview of the Scientific Advisory Committee:
The manner in which counsel can present and argue from evidence at trial is not
within the statutory scope of Committee review, which includes the ‘analytical
work, reports, and conclusions of scientists employed by the Department.’
Accordingly, I cannot find that the review authority of the Scientific Advisory
Committee extends to encompass a review of the manner in which prosecutors
and defense attorneys attempt to present evidence at trial, or to [the] assessment of
the objectivity or propriety of arguments made from such evidence by trial
counsel. For these reasons I find that your request for the review of the case
Commonwealth v. Robin Lovitt does not fall within the scope of the review
authority of the Committee.97
The Board’s refusal to consider the Lovitt case seems wrongheaded for several
reasons. First, as should be obvious to readers of this article, the problems with DNA
evidence in the Lovitt case went well beyond the manner in which counsel presented and
argued from the evidence in court. It raises a number of important issues about the
interpretation and reporting of DNA test results, such as the appropriate standards for
declaring a finding “inconclusive,” whether (as Professor Holland argued) the laboratory
has an obligation to disclose “inconclusive” results that are helpful to a defendant, and
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whether, having declared a result “inconclusive” the analyst should nevertheless testify in
court in a manner that links the defendant to the evidence. Surely these matters fall
within the statutory authority of the Scientific Advisory Committee.
Mr. Sengel sidestepped the Board’s responsibility to review these important
matters by construing the question presented as a purely legal one:
While it is certainly true that ineffective assistance of counsel or improper use of
evidence by the government may deprive a defendant of a fair trial, determination
of such a question requires legal, not scientific, analysis of all the evidence in the
case by a court of competent jurisdiction. Such matters are within the provice of
appellate courts.98
Clearly, this narrow construction of the issues presented is wrong. Moreover, like the
Fourth Circuit’s world-weary suggestion that all possible issues in the Lovitt case had
been exhausted (and further review was pointless and tiresome), this argument rings
hollow in light of our knowledge of the underlying problems in the case and the failure of
the judicial system to deal with them. It is ironic that the Forensic Science Board would
declare the issues in the Lovitt case appropriate matters for the appellate courts when, as
we have seen, the appellate courts failed utterly to address or even consider those issues.
By passing the buck in this manner, the Forensic Science Board effectively ended
Lovitt’s last hope of having an official body review the evidence in his case. This refusal
to look at the evidence is all the more disappointing in light of the fact that electronic
files may still exist that have never been reviewed using modern techniques and could
still prove enlightening on the key issues. The decision of the Board shut the door on
further examination of the evidence in the case. That door is likely to stay closed.
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V. Lessons from Lovitt
The jury that convicted Robin Lovitt of capital murder was misinformed about
key facts of the case. It was a conviction obtained under false scientific pretenses.
Whether Lovitt is actually guilty or not can be debated, but it seems quite clear that his
trial was unfair. Close examination of this case suggests that we have a system of trial in
which scientific findings can be misrepresented. Perhaps equally important it show us
that our system of appellate and habeas review can fail to recognize these problems.
Although the problems with the Lovitt case have been readily apparent to several outside
observers who happened to review the evidence and testimony, the judicial system has
turned a blind eye to the matter, as has the state board assigned to oversee forensic
science in Virginia. The governor of Virginia commuted the death sentence to life
imprisonment, but according to his official statement the commutation had nothing to do
with the fairness of the trial. Despite the reduction in sentence, the case should properly
be viewed as an embarrassing failure of our system of justice.
The problems began in the laboratory, where the lack of objective standards for
distinguishing conclusive from inconclusive DNA test results allowed a state laboratory
analyst to report that the results of DNA testing on Lovitt’s jacket were “inconclusive”
even though the results actually undermined the prosecution’s case by showing that the
blood on Lovitt’s jacket came from Lovitt himself, and not (as the prosecutor had
claimed) from the murder victim. It continued at trial where a prosecutor pressed the
laboratory analyst to testify in a manner that improperly linked Lovitt to the blood on the
murder weapon and argued (incorrectly) that the victim’s blood was found on Lovitt’s
jacket. The defense lawyers were also deficient. They apparently failed to investigate
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the case sufficiently to realize that the DNA evidence from the jacket was actually
exculpatory, and they failed to make an effective challenge to the weak DNA evidence
that was used to link their client to the murder weapon. Part of their problem appears to
have been an incompetent defense expert, who botched his genetic frequency calculations
and presented statistical estimates to the jury that significantly overstated the value of the
evidence linking Lovitt to the murder weapon.
During the appellate process these problems went unrecognized. Lovitt’s direct
appeal was handled by one of his trial lawyers, with the assistance of another lawyer. It
is unclear whether these lawyers even recognized the problems that are the focus of this
article. Even if they had recognized these problems, it is doubtful that they could have
raised them on direct appeal. The focus of the direct appeal is on procedural error and it
seems difficult if not impossible to link the problems that occurred in Lovitt’s trial to
specific procedural faults, such as incorrect evidentiary rulings by the trial judge.
The failure of counsel to raise these problems during the state and federal habeas
proceedings requires a more extensive explanation. The testimony of Dr. Riley during
the state habeas hearing provided all the basic facts that we have relied upon to show the
unfairness of Lovitt’s trial. Although this information was available in the record that
they created, appellate counsel may not have fully appreciated its significance. In
particular, they appear not to have appreciated that the “inconclusive” results on the
jacket actually constituted exculpatory data in their own right.99 Although Dr. Riley

99

At a recent conference at UCLA, Professor Kenneth Starr, who was lead counsel for Lovitt during the
habeas proceedings appeared on a panel with the authors of this article. After hearing the authors’ analysis
of the DNA evidence in the Lovitt case, Professor Starr candidly acknowledged that Lovitt’s lawyers,
although aware of the deficiencies in the DNA evidence noted by Dr. Riley, may not have fully appreciated
their significance. To the extent that is true, we believe it reflects the inherent difficulty of the subject
matter and not any lack of diligence or professionalism by habeas counsel who, as already noted, were

Thompson & Dioso-Villa

43

expressed the opinion that the DNA profile on the jacket was consistent with Lovitt, he
did not calculate the rarity of the matching profile. Hence, counsel apparently did not
know that there was a highly specific, 1-in-10,000 match with Lovitt.
Even if they had appreciated that point, it is unclear whether if would have made a
difference. The major problem Lovitt faced was a poor fit between the specific problems
with the scientific evidence in his trial and the standard doctrinal framework that courts
employ for habeas review. In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, for
example, Lovitt’s habeas counsel needed to establish that his trial lawyers performed
below reasonable professional standards.100 But Lovitt’s trial lawyers obtained an
independent expert and at least made an effort to challenge the evidence that allegedly
connected Lovitt to the murder weapon. Those steps alone probably met or even
exceeded the constitutional standard of effectiveness.101 Nor is it clear that defense
counsels’ performance fell below reasonable professional standards by virtue of their
failure to look beyond the “inconclusive” findings reported on the jacket and to realize
the results were actually exculpatory. It is plausible that most defense lawyers would
have accepted the conclusions of that report without further inquiry.
Similar problems of fit arise when considering whether there was prosecutorial
misconduct with regard to the DNA evidence. There is no reason to believe that the
prosecutors suppressed any DNA test results. Although we can now recognize that their
arguments to the jury were misleading, there is no reason to believe that the prosecutors
superb lawyers. If they had difficulty fully understanding the scientific evidence, then any lawyer would
have.
100
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were knowingly or intentionally misrepresenting facts. Hence it is difficult to make a
case that these arguments violated Lovitt’s constitutional rights.
In sum, it is difficult to trace the problems with the presentation of DNA evidence
in the Lovitt case to any particular error or misconduct by prosecutor, defense counsel or
judge that would constitute a violation of Lovitt’s constitutional rights. Although we
believe most reasonable people applying standards of everyday morality would consider
his trial unfair due to the misleading presentation of key scientific evidence, it was not the
kind of unfairness that is easily recognized as a constitutional violation in the context of
post-conviction habeas review. Recognizing that fact, Lovitt’s habeas counsel may have
simply concluded that arguments about the presentation of DNA evidence were not as
promising as the other arguments that they chose to present instead.
Viewed in this light, the failure of the judicial system to recognize or remedy the
problems with the DNA evidence in the Lovitt case reflect broader problems with the
legal standards under which courts conduct habeas review. As a number of scholars have
pointed out, our system’s focus on procedural error and misconduct can allow
questionable verdicts to stand in cases where there are defects in the evidence that cannot
be traced to these factors.
In recognition of this problem, Professor D. Michael Risinger has recently
proposed that claims of factual innocence, such as Lovitt’s claim, should be reviewed
under reformed standards, similar to those applied in British courts of appeal, that call for
overturning convictions that, for any reason, are deemed “unsafe.”102 In our view, the
Lovitt case is an example of an “unsafe verdict.” The failure of our current system to
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recognize and remedy that problem, but granting a new trial, is a case-in-point illustration
of the wisdom and desireability of Professor Risinger’s proposal.
VI. Conclusion
There is a longstanding public perception that innocent people have little to fear
in the American justice system. The system offers a variety of procedural protections
that are designed to work to the advantage of the accused, making convictions difficult to
obtain in any but the strongest cases. This perception is reflected in a famous observation
of Judge Learned Hand:
Under our criminal procedure, the accused has every advantage… He is immune
from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is
the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve… Our dangers do not lie
in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always haunted by
the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream.103
If false convictions are an “unreal dream” in criminal cases in general, they
should be even less likely in capital cases. Because “death is different” capital
defendants are afforded procedural protections at every stage that go beyond those
offered to other defendants. 104 During their trials, capital defendants typically are
represented by more experienced and better-funded lawyers than other defendants and
have greater access to the services of investigators and experts. After conviction, capital
cases are typically reviewed more thoroughly and at higher appellate levels than other
criminal cases. Once direct appeals are exhausted, capital defendants can pursue
collateral review through state and federal habeas actions. The lawyers who represent
them in these habeas actions often have extensive resources which are used to
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reinvestigate or further investigate the underlying case, review the adequacy of the initial
legal representation, and otherwise ferret out problems. By the time the collateral review
is concluded, any possible problem with the fairness of the conviction should have been
fully exposed and thoroughly vetted. Because capital cases receive such “intense
scrutiny,” no stone should be unturned, no issue ignored, no problem neglected.
Out study of the case of Robin Lovitt offers a striking counter-example that
challenges this common perception. We have shown that serious problems with the key
scientific evidence in a capital case, problems that raise doubts about the accuracy of the
verdict, went unrecognized and unremedied. Without careful attention to this failure of
the justice system, and meaningful reform, the danger exists that Judge Hand’s unreal
dream could become a waking nightmare for a falsely convicted capital defendant.
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